Since spring 2024, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) has arrested more than 700 individuals whom Russian intelligence recruited or attempted to recruit for espionage, arson, bombings, or sabotage. Among them, 175 (approximately 25%) are minors. The issue of online recruitment remains widespread: the SBU chatbot has received more than 18,000 reports from citizens about recruitment attempts online.

Teenagers are promised “easy money,” but:
– they are rarely if ever paid;
– they are used and then eliminated to avoid leaving witnesses.

The consequences are death, injury, and/or imprisonment.

Two teenagers (aged 15 and 17) in Ivano-Frankivsk were recruited through a local Telegram job channel. For $1,700, they agreed to assemble and plant two explosive devices. The FSB handler, however, only transferred small amounts to cover the cost of components, then remotely detonated the explosives with the children present: the 17-year-old was killed on the spot, while the 15-year-old lost both legs and nearly lost his eyesight.

In Ternopil, a 14-year-old girl was blackmailed using explicit personal photos and forced to assemble an explosive device and place it near a district police station. Russian special services planned to detonate it remotely, but law enforcement officers managed to defuse it in time and prevent the child’s death. If found guilty, she could face up to 10 years in prison and confiscation of property.

Who is at risk of recruitment?

• Underage children. They fall for it because of their vulnerability, lack of experience, desire for quick money or emotional “adventure”. 
• Young people looking for work. Students, school graduates who post “looking for a part-time job” announcements on social media and Telegram channels.
• People with drug or alcohol addiction or financial difficulties. Criminals speculate on the desire for quick money or a new dose.

However, in fact, they can target anyone. The FSB also sent messages even to groups of military personnel, trying to recruit them. There were also attempts to establish contact with ordinary passers-by in public transport in Lviv using posters with QR codes.

How exactly does the Russian FSB recruit teenagers? 

Russian special services use various recruitment schemes. Here are three of the most common scenarios: 

• Blackmail with personal data 

They crack into a teenager’s phone or account, find “sensitive” information (photos, videos, correspondence) and use it as leverage: “Either you do our task or everyone will know about it”. The child is frightened and, in order not to lose his or her reputation, performs tasks: photographing objects, setting fire to cars, sabotaging railways or administrative buildings

• They pay for “small” tasks and promise more, but instead of the “final reward” they blow them up.

The victim is found online: through Telegram, TikTok, Discord, job search groups, posters with QR codes in cities. And they involve them step by step. At first, they give a “simple and safe” task: take a photo, make a graffiti, take the “package” to another place. And they pay a small amount as a guarantee that the money will continue.  But instead, they blow up the children on the “final” task in order to avoid paying the money and cover their tracks.

• They blackmail the child with something they have already done 

The victim is found online, first instructions are given, and then blackmail and pressure begin: “You have already become an accomplice in a crime, now do more serious things, otherwise we will tell the police”. This is how a frightened teenager is persuaded to commit arson, terrorist attacks, and sabotage. What are the signs that a child may be recruited or may be at risk? 

They are often expressed in changes in behaviour and environment: 

• A strange new daily schedule: the child regularly disappears without explanation, returns late.
• Sudden mood changes that were not present before.

• Secret correspondence: changing passwords, frequent deletion of correspondence history, hostility when you ask “What are you looking at on your phone?”.
• New social circle: “friends” from the Internet that the child has never mentioned before.
• New property and money: the child gets expensive things, gadgets, or money that he or she can’t explain the origin of. You may also hear a teenager talking about “easy money” on the Internet because they believe in it.

Why do children agree?

• They want money: 2-10 thousand UAH seems like a lot of money for a teenager.
• Need for attention and recognition: if a child lacks support at home, they look for it online.
• An element of play or extreme: adolescents perceive it as an “adventure” without realising the consequences.
• Manipulation and blackmail: first, they are tricked into doing “easy tasks”, then threatened.

What are the consequences for the child? 

• Criminal liability: a child can be convicted of a terrorist attack or sabotage from the age of 14. Sentences are very serious – from 10 years in prison to life imprisonment.
• Danger to life and health: russian curators often blow up children remotely to cover their tracks and avoid paying money.
• Psychological trauma: even if a child doesn’t die or lose his or her health, he or she becomes a hostage to constant fear and blackmail.

How can parents prevent this? 

• Open communication: no criticism or shouting. Talk about real cases, explain the risks.
• Discuss “online safety” together: explain that “easy work” with quick earnings on social media is a huge risk and almost always a fraud. And teach your child that if they receive strange offers, they should contact you immediately.
• Teach your child media literacy. Explain how to check information and why you shouldn’t trust anonymous contacts. Teach them that it’s better to lose a quick and often imaginary UAH 2-10 thousand than to lose their whole life (or risk it).
• Regular attention: notice sudden changes in behaviour, large sums of money or new acquaintances.
• Talk about responsibility: talk about responsibility for crimes. Their young age will not keep them out of prison.
• Legal ways of earning money and financial literacy: if you can, give your child a fixed amount of pocket money every month. Or help your teenager find a safe part-time job, show them an alternative.

What to do if there is already contact with recruiters

• Save evidence: screenshots, correspondence, contacts.
• Contact law enforcement immediately:
• police – 102
• SSU chatbot ‘’Spaly FSB‘’ in Telegram – t.me/spaly_fsb_bot
• Explain to your child that cooperation with law enforcement can save them from punishment and even death. If he or she is afraid to tell you, let him or her contact them on their own.

Advice from the SSU: “If someone offers to “just carry a package”, take a picture of a military unit or set a car on fire, know that they want to use you and then kill you”.

Talking to children works! In Odesa, a 9th-grade student who was planned to be recruited by the FSB did not give in. Unknown persons wrote to him on Telegram and offered to ‘’earn extra money‘’. The task was to set fire to TCR cars and administrative buildings and leave graffiti on them. He was promised money for this. The schoolboy saved the correspondence on his phone and handed it over to an inspector of the Educational Security Service. 

So how can a teenager earn money safely?

Here are some ideas for teenagers to earn extra money

• Help at home, in the family business, or with friends. Encourage children with symbolic tasks for which they can receive money from you 
• Tutoring younger children, looking after animals
• Managing social media for brands
• Handmade work: handmade, crafts, drawing
• Participation in volunteer projects with a scholarship
• Online freelancing (design, texts) 
• Explain that honest earnings are possible. Help them find it and make sure that this offer is safe for the child. 

And remember that teenagers are being recruited in all regions of Ukraine, without exception. Anyone – father or mother – can spot a threat in time if they communicate with their child and are attentive.

During the war, due to the tense security situation in the country, Ukrainians began to exchange more information in group chats of messengers and social media. It’s necessary to be in touch with neighbors in today’s realities. It’s a matter of safety, awareness and supporting each other. However, it’s important to do it correctly – so as not to harm yourself and others. Here are tips on how to make the chat of your house safe and useful at the same time:

• Be considerate of new chat members. Don’t accuse them of collaborating with the enemy on the slightest suspicion. Most often, new members of the house chat are just new residents. Before you start looking for spies among them, analyze the reasons for your suspicions. Often such doubts can be triggered by the stress of bad news.

• Don’t share data about military facilities and critical infrastructure. Sometimes chats with a large number of participants can be used by the enemy to conduct intelligence and destructive propaganda through individual members of the chats. Fair suspicion is caused by chat participants who try to collect information about:
  • warehouses, repair bases and fleets;
  • engineering-equipped positions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and places of residences of personnel;
  • hospitals;
  • important infrastructure facilities – thermal power plants, oil depots, hydraulic structures, etc.;
  • routes of movement of our military personnel, weapons and ammunition.

To prevent sensitive information from falling into the hands of the enemy, don’t publish or distribute such data in messengers groups. If you’re the administrator of the chat, set the appropriate rules and warn the participants about the importance of following them. 

• Don’t share information about the locations of enemy missiles and drones hits in chats. Such information can be used by the enemy to adjust the accuracy of strikes and identify gaps in the air defense system. In the conditions of martial law, the publication of photographs locating the territory and/or real estate is subject to criminal liability. Don’t share in public chats any information about hits, shelling and destruction before it appears in official sources.

However, remain prudent. Strange or unknown sounds heard by one of the neighbors is an acceptable topic for discussion. After all, home chats exist to solve everyday problems, and such questions can be related to emergency situations in the house.

• Demand the chat administrator to delete messages of value to the enemy. Among them are those that may contain:

• • geotags and other metadata of sent files – photo or video;
  • recognizable elements of the area that can be identified on the map – characteristic buildings, landscape, road signs, outdoor advertising, etc.;
  • serial numbers on debris of enemy ammunition;
  • license plates of military equipment, markings on it;
  • real names/surnames of military personnel, their faces.

• Don’t spread information about the liberation of settlements from occupation, unless it’s confirmed by official sources. 

Deoccupation isn’t a one moment and irreversible act, but a complex and sometimes long process, the end of which can only be determined by the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Early spreading of release notices may create unwarranted expectations and put local residents at risk. For example, if they try to return to their apartments due to unverified data. Therefore, distribute information about the liberation of territories or a counterattack only after its official confirmation.

In addition, drawing media attention to a newly liberated settlement can encourage the enemy to make efforts to regain positions.

• Don’t allow yourself to be provoked into emotions, enmity and “betrayal”. 

Disputes in group chats contribute to fueling enmity between Ukrainians. There have been documented cases of emotionally charged calls for wrongdoing being circulated through communities. For example, for the closure of auto and tramways with requirements to turn on the lights. Such propaganda can weaken defense capabilities, so don’t support its spread. Manipulators play on excessive emotions and a sense of injustice. “There is no light in our house, but there is in another” or “there is no electricity in our region, because it’s sent to another region/sold abroad” – vivid examples of such incitement. To avoid emotional influence, always verify information with the help of independent sources – official channels of state institutions, local authorities, in official media. Also take care of establishing and following the rules of the chat: define moderators, unacceptable topics and vocabulary when communicating. Following these rules will allow you to share ideas, thoughts, and information safely and freely in your group chat.

The instruction was developed by the Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security under the Ministry of Culture and Information together with Rakuten Viber. Media experts – the author of the “NotaYenota” project Alyona Romanyuk and the head of the Independent Media Trade Union of Ukraine Serhii Shturkhetskyi joined the development of the recommendations. 

There may be no mobile communication in an emergency. If it is, but it’s weak, you can use lightweight versions of many applications (Facebook Lite, Google Go, Google Maps Go). As a result, they take up less space and run faster, even with poor Internet access.

You should also install the maps app on your smartphone, which does not need the network. For example, mapy.cz, or enable the appropriate feature on Google Maps. Note that applications do not automatically download the necessary maps – you must do so in advance.

Consider purchasing an additional spare push-button phone. It can work longer than a smartphone if you use it only for conversations.

When mobile communication is unavailable due to network damage or prolonged power outages, we recommend using national roaming. This service is provided by all Ukrainian operators. How to connect — read here.

If both the internet and mobile networks are unavailable, offline messengers can help you stay in touch with relatives or neighbors.

According to the Center for National Resistance, these applications carry certain risks for residents of temporarily occupied areas. Having such a messenger on your phone may raise additional questions from occupying forces and put you at risk.

In wartime conditions, this option can be used as a supplementary means of communication during active hostilities or street actions.

The key feature of offline messengers is that they operate via Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, and networks of smartphones with the same applications installed. The range of these messengers is approximately 100 meters.

Please note that these applications are not yet widely used in Ukraine, so government authorities have not issued official assessments of their safety and do not guarantee confidentiality.

We therefore recommend using offline messengers only in extreme cases, when they are your only means of communication.

If you still decide to install an offline messenger, download applications only from official websites or stores — the App Store and Google Play.

What offline messengers are available?

Bridgefy — an offline messaging app

Availability: free
Where to download? iOS link — here, Android link — here.

How does it work? Via Bluetooth, and only with users who have also installed the app.

Range: up to 100 meters.

Available modes:

• Text messages and image sharing between two people or a group (neighbors, family). The recipient does not need to be in your contact list, but to message them you need to enter their phone number.
• Broadcast mode — send messages to all users who have launched the app and are within a 100-meter radius (useful for sharing information during large events, protests, etc.).

Data security: all messages sent between two users or within a group are protected. You do not need to create an account or share your phone number to use the app. However, phone number verification can make it easier to find specific users.

Please note that the Broadcast feature does not protect the content of your messages — it sends them to all users with the Bridgefy app within range (100 m).

Briar

Availability: free, but only for Android
Where to download? Android link — here.

How does it work? Via Bluetooth or Wi-Fi, and only with users who have also installed the app.

Range: approximately 10 meters; however, if you are farther away, the app will store the message and deliver it once you are back within range.

Available modes:

• text chat with one or multiple people via Bluetooth (select a contact in the app and Text chat with one or multiple people via Bluetooth (select a contact in the app and tap “Connect via Bluetooth”) or via a Wi-Fi hotspot you create.
• Thematic forum (experimental) — synchronized communication with users who have the app installed and whom you invite to join. Access is granted only after they accept the invitation.
• Blog — create a blog whose posts will be visible to all contacts you have added. Without internet: visible to those within a 10-meter radius; with internet: visible to all contacts regardless of distance.

Data security: works without phone number verification. You only need to enter a name (or username) and set a password. Other users can find you by your username.

Bitchat — a messaging app

Availability: free

Where to download? iOS link — here, Android link — here.

How does it work? Without internet or mobile connection. The app uses a Bluetooth mesh network: devices connect directly and relay messages from one to another within signal range.

Range: approximately 10–30 meters between devices via Bluetooth (depending on device model and obstacles). In mesh mode, messages can be relayed through nearby users’ devices.

Data security: no phone number or email required for registration

By the way, radios are another way to stay connected when there is no mobile network or internet. Learn how to use them here.

In the absence of mobile communication, a walkie-talkie can replace the phone. For example, when you need to move to a safe place, these devices will help a family communicate with each other.

Modern walkie-talkies are easy to use and have a built-in FM receiver. However, we recommend that you prepare a spare battery.

Do not turn on the walkie-talkie on the police or other services frequencies: this will interfere with their work.

Maintaining communication in occupied areas is often not just a matter of safety, but of survival. Here’s how to ensure you have access to mobile communication, internet, and television.

Mobile communication and phones

1. If Ukrainian mobile service has not disappeared entirely but your operator’s network is unavailable, try connecting to other Ukrainian mobile operators using national roaming. This service is provided by all Ukrainian operators. How to connect — read here.
2. If possible, avoid using Russian SIM cards. If you must purchase one, try to obtain it without presenting a passport, so as not to share your personal data with the occupying forces.
3. Russian security services have access to Russian mobile operator networks, so using their mobile services requires maximum caution. When speaking on the phone, keep to neutral, everyday topics and avoid anything that could endanger you or your loved ones — do not discuss the locations or movements of occupying forces, occupation authorities, and so on. It is best to minimize phone calls altogether and use messengers with open-source code and end-to-end encryption.
4. Do not store sensitive information on your phone. Delete all content from your device that could put you at risk if detained by occupying forces: messages, photos, videos, downloaded files. You can do this manually (do not forget to empty the trash) or by using apps that permanently delete files.

Another option is to reset your phone to factory settings. This will delete all data and files from the device with no possibility of recovery. To do this:

Android: go to Settings → General management → Reset → Factory data reset (menu names may vary depending on your device).

iOS: go to Settings → General → Transfer or Reset iPhone → Erase All Content and Settings.

Keep in mind that a completely empty phone may also raise suspicion among occupying forces.

1. Review which apps on your phone or subscriptions in messengers and social media may raise suspicion, and remove them.
2. Always use your phone’s built-in security features (password, pattern lock, fingerprint, etc.) to make unauthorized access more difficult in case of loss or seizure.
3. Disable location services.
4. If possible, keep an old working phone that you can hand over if demanded by occupying forces.

Internet

1. If possible, use a VPN service (especially if your internet provider is connected to Russian networks). VPN services allow you to avoid tracking, access restricted resources, and visit blocked websites. Occupiers currently block many such services, so you may need to find one that still works. Also keep in mind that having a VPN app on your device may raise suspicion.
2. If you have a Ukrainian internet provider, communicate via Wi-Fi whenever possible and make calls through messengers. How to configure them safely — read here.
3. Use strong passwords for all accounts (how to do this — read here) and enable two-factor authentication.
4. Do not store on computers or laptops — and delete from memory — any information that could put you at risk if detained: messages, photos, videos, downloaded files. After deleting files, remember to empty the trash.
5. Do not connect to unknown open Wi-Fi networks or devices sharing internet access.
6. If you use social media, remove all personal information from your profile settings (phone number, date of birth, place of residence, workplace, etc.). Do not post content that could provoke a negative reaction from occupying forces. Where possible, restrict access to your profile to people you trust.

Radio and television

Since the beginning of the war, Ukrainian television has been broadcast unencrypted via satellite and is free to access. The signal can be received using a satellite receiver or a built-in TV tuner.

Search for Ukrainian channels using the following parameters:

Satellite Astra 4A (4.8°E). Frequencies and polarization: 11766 H, 12130 V, 12437 V.

Satellite Amos 3 (4.0°W). Frequencies and polarization: 11140 H, 11175 H.

Important! Some of this advice may not apply depending on the conditions and situation in occupied areas. Always take the operational environment into account and prioritize your personal safety.

Russia is deploying artificial intelligence tools to make its disinformation more convincing and mislead an ever-growing number of people. Some Ukrainians also misuse such tools to artificially inflate the popularity of their social media platforms.

In this guide, we explain why you cannot trust everything you see and how to recognize a deepfake.

A deepfake is artificially generated video, audio, or imagery created to deceive, depicting a specific person or group of people.

Today, deepfakes are actively used for several reasons:

• Novelty. Ukrainian online audiences are still not sufficiently familiar with this type of disinformation, making users more likely to believe the information presented in a deepfake.

Example: at the end of 2023, fake videos were widely shared on social media claiming that Volodymyr Zelenskyy had announced payments of UAH 16,000 to Ukrainians who had not left the country during the full-scale war.

• Effectiveness. A deepfake can be created using footage of any politician, actor, or public figure. The subject can be made to say anything in any language, combining video and audio to present it as a real breaking news story.

Example: in March 2022, a video aired on “Ukraine 24” allegedly showing Volodymyr Zelenskyy announcing Ukraine’s capitulation.

• Simplicity. Deepfakes can be generated in minutes using AI tools. The simpler the deepfake, the easier it is to detect — and conversely, the more effort put into creating it, the harder it becomes to debunk. Russian propaganda uses both simple and sophisticated deepfakes depending on the information agenda.

Types of deepfakes

1. Commercial. The creators set up TikTok or Instagram pages that imitate well-known Ukrainian media outlets or influencers and fill them with AI-generated videos on sensitive social topics (mobilization, the return of men from abroad, frontline news, etc.). Such videos usually provide only partial information and direct users to anonymous Telegram channels for the full story. To access it, users must subscribe — but no useful information is ever actually provided. These deepfakes are mainly used to inflate audience numbers.
2. Entertainment. These are typically posted on satirical Telegram channels, playing on well-known or current topics.For example, variations of statements by Belarusian self-proclaimed leader Lukashenko, or fictional  “threats” by SBU Head Vasyl Maliuk directed at those filming air defense operations. Their goal is to entertain and attract followers.
3. PSYOP (information and psychological operations). Russian PSYOPs aim to undermine trust in Ukrainian authorities and the Defense Forces, weaken the will to resist, and spread panic. Example: in November 2023, Russian Telegram channels spread ffake videos of Valerii Zaluzhnyi allegedly calling on the Armed Forces of Ukraine to abandon their positions and seize power.

In 2025, several high-profile cases in Ukraine’s media space demonstrated how AI and video deepfakes are used for disinformation. Propaganda networks spread fake videos about the alleged mobilization of nearly one million women and a “travel ban,” falsely attributed to a deputy prime minister. These claims were debunked by Ukrainian fact-checkers.

On TikTok, AI-generated clones of well-known Ukrainian journalists — using their voices and likenesses — have been widely used to spread fabricated messages that have garnered millions of views, undermining trust in the media and distorting public information.

AI-generated videos allegedly featuring “Ukrainian soldiers” are also being spread across international and local social media platforms. These depict fictional scenes of “forced mobilization” or emotional appeals, aimed at shaping narratives and undermining trust in the Ukrainian government and Western support.

These cases illustrate how synthetic media technologies have become a tool of information warfare, with the goals of creating panic, weakening social cohesion, and manipulating public opinion.

How to recognize a deepfake

Signs that a video may be fake:

• the speaker’s facial expressions, especially lip movements, do not fully match the speech;
• the video is published not on a verified news outlet or official account, but on an anonymous social media channel;
• poor video quality;
• absence of background sounds or ambient noise;
• the speaker’s voice differs from their real voice;
• the statement contradicts the speaker’s known positions — for example, if Valerii Zaluzhnyi suddenly calls for a coup, or Volodymyr Zelenskyy unexpectedly orders a retreat from Avdiivka.

To detect deepfakes in images, pay attention to:

• small details in the image;
• blurred or oddly smooth faces;
• overly glossy skin;
• extra or missing limbs;
• distorted symbols (e.g., incorrect flag elements);
• unnatural backgrounds;
• unnatural body positions.

Tools to detect deepfakes

To verify audio authenticity:

Free tools:
– AI or Not
– AI Speech Classifier (can detect whether audio was generated via ElevenLabs; supports Ukrainian)

Paid tools:
– AI Voice Detector
– Resemble Detect

To verify image authenticity (free tools):

– Fake News Debunker by InVID & WeVerify
– FotoForensics
– AI or Not

How not to fall for a deepfake

1. Manage your emotional response. Deepfakes are designed to provoke emotions. If content feels more emotional than informative, pause and avoid impulsive reactions — especially sharing it.
2. Assess the source objectively. Is it a trusted media outlet or an anonymous social media channel? Check what else the page posts. If it regularly shares sensational or emotionally charged content, it is likely unreliable.
3. Verify through trusted media. Check reputable Ukrainian media from the Institute of Mass Information’s “white list.” If they have not reported the story, it is likely fake. Also consult Ukrainian fact-checking organizations such as VoxCheck, the Center for Strategic Communications, and StopFake.

If you identify a deepfake or are unsure about a piece of content, report it via the chatbot of the Center for Strategic Communications.

This guide was developed based on recommendations from the VoxCheck fact-checking project.

First of all, rely on official communications from government institutions. Follow updates from the State Emergency Service, the Armed Forces, and the government on their websites and social media pages, as well as through Suspilne Broadcasting.

Below you will find a list of verified sources. Please note that on social media, verified accounts have a special mark — a blue checkmark next to the name. This confirms that the page is genuinely run by that person or institution. However, not all official institutions in Ukraine have received verification yet, so also rely on the accounts listed below.

Suspilne Broadcasting:
· TV channel UA:Pershyi
· UA: Radio Promin
· UA: Ukrainian Radio

Websites of government services:

• State Emergency Service of Ukraine
  · facebook
  · twitter
  · instagram
  · telegram
• Armed Forces of Ukraine
  · facebook
  · twitter
  · instagram
• Ministry of Defense of Ukraine
  · facebook
  · twitter
  · instagram
• Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine
  · facebook
  · twitter
  · instagram

Useful chatbots in Viber

In Telegram, the enemy often creates fake chatbot clones to mislead Ukrainians and collect their personal data. You can check whether a bot is safe here.

Unlike Telegram, this problem does not exist in Viber. Chatbots and channels there go through moderation (verification by platform administrators), so no one can duplicate an existing bot or channel.

Below are useful chatbots available in Viber.

Chatbots for your safety

• Безпека: довідник — an informational chatbot of the Dovidka.info project. It contains action plans for various emergency situations that may occur during war.
• Пункти Незламності — a chatbot with information about Invincibility Points in your city and their geolocation search.
• Де укриття? — a chatbot with information about shelters in your city and their geolocation search.
• Handy Friends Bot — a digital assistant for Ukrainians abroad.

Chatbots for countering fakes

• SPRAVDbot — a bot from the Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security. You can send a fake or a news item you doubt, and specialists will verify it. If it is fake, they will debunk it.

Useful chatbots of government bodies and organizations

• Diia — informational and service chatbot of Diia
• Ukrposhta — Ukrposhta chatbot with information and services

Chatbots of human rights organizations

• Warcrime bot — a chatbot for documenting war crimes

Chatbots for data search

• Opendatabot — a chatbot providing access to Ukraine’s open data registries

Useful channels on WhatsApp

Due to concerns about the reliability and security of Telegram, more and more government institutions and organizations are creating information channels on other platforms, including WhatsApp.

If you decide to stop using Telegram or want to diversify your news sources, here is a list of verified WhatsApp channels we recommend subscribing to.

Official government channels

• Volodymyr Zelenskyy — official channel of the President of Ukraine
• Olena Zelenska — official channel of the First Lady of Ukraine
• Minister of Defense of Ukraine – Mykhailo Fedorov — official channel of the Minister of Defense of Ukraine
• SES of Ukraine — official channel of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine
• Kyrylo Budanov — official WhatsApp channel of the Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine

Channels about Ukraine

• Ukraine.ua — official channel of Ukraine — a brave country fighting for freedom in the heart of Europe. Subscribe to receive verified news and explore Ukraine.
• UNITED24 Media — shows the real Ukraine and how it impacts people around the world

Military channels

• Air Force | UA Air Force — official channel of the Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
• Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine — official channel
• AZOV — official channel of the 12th Special Purpose Brigade “Azov” of the National Guard of Ukraine

Channels countering fakes

• SPRAVDI — channel of the Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security. Debunks Russian fakes and explains key events
• StopFake — a journalistic organization focused on fact-checking, media literacy, and distinguishing facts from propaganda

Channels of your local authorities

• Kyiv City Military Administration — official channel
• Kyiv Regional Military Administration — official channel with regional updates
• Vitalii Kim / Mykolaiv Regional Military Administration — official channel
• Lviv Regional Military Administration — official channel
• Poltava Regional Military Administration — official channel
• Khmelnytskyi Regional Military Administration — official channel
• Chernihiv Regional Military Administration — official channel
• Mykolaiv Regional Military Administration — official channel
• Rivne Regional State Administration — official channel
• Cherkasy Regional Military Administration — official regional updates
• Ternopil Regional Military Administration — official channel
• Chernivtsi Regional Military Administration — official page

Telegram Channels Posing as Ukrainian but Actually Pro-Russian

The Center for Strategic Communications, together with the SBU, has published a list of Telegram channels that present themselves as “independent news sources” but are actually coordinated by the Kremlin. These include “Resident,” “Legitimny,” “Kartel,” “Spletnitsa,” and others.

Sometimes it is difficult to identify these channels as dangerous, as they skillfully mix propaganda with real news.

We strongly recommend reviewing your subscriptions using this list and unsubscribing from any of the following channels:

• Krokodil (@KrokooDil)
  · SheptunUA Ukraine War (@sheptoon)
  · Legitimny (@legitimniy)
  · Anatoliy Shariy (@ASupersharij)
  · Resident (@rezident_ua)
  · Montyan! (@montyan2)
  · ZeRada (@ZeRada1)
  · Open Ukraine (@OpenUkraine)
  · UKR LEAKS (@ukr_leaks)
  · Spletnitsa (@spletnicca)
  · Kartel (@ZE_kartel)
  · Olga Shariy (@OlgaSharij)
  · Ukraina.ru (@ukraina_ru)
  · MediaKiller (@MediaKiller2021)
  · TeleDNO (@tvdno)
  · Woman with a Braid (@skosoi)
  · Typical Odesa (@odessa_typical)
  · War on Fakes (@warfakes)
  · Main in Kherson and Region (@hercon_ru)
  · Black Quarter (@cherniy_kvartal)
  · Chief of Staff (@nach_shtabu)
  · Rebel (@buntariy)
  · Naglyy (@maksnazar)
  · Ukraine. Special Operation. Monitoring (@MonitoringUA)
  · I am Kramatorsk (@news_kramatorsk)
  · Odesa Fraer (@life_odessa)
  · Banned Ukraine (@godeye_ru)
  · Kovpak Unit (@otryadkovpaka)
  · Shkvarka News (@belshkvarka)
  · SBU Mole (@SBUmole)
  · Tsibulya UA (@tsibulya_ua)
  · Melitopol City Administration (@melitopoladmin)
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