Russians are recruiting Ukrainian teenagers: how to protect your family?

In 2024-2025, the SSU recorded more than 400 cases of attempts to involve Ukrainians in arson, terrorist attacks or sabotage. Every 5th person was underage (22% of those recruited). In most cases, the Russian FSB is behind this.

Teenagers are promised “easy money”, but:

– they usually don’t get the money;

– they use them and then clean them up to leave no trace.

The consequences are death, injury and/or imprisonment.

Two teenagers (15 and 17 years old) in Ivano-Frankivsk were recruited through a local Telegram channel looking for work. They agreed to make and install two explosive devices in return for $1,700. However, the FSB supervisor paid only small amounts for the purchase of components and remotely detonated the explosives together with the children: A 17-year-old died on the spot, a 15-year-old lost both legs and almost lost his eyesight.

In Ternopil, a 14-year-old girl was blackmailed with her personal (nude) photos, forced to make explosives and plant them near the police station. Russian intelligence services planned to detonate the device remotely during the attack, but law enforcement officers managed to defuse it and save the child from death. The girl faces life imprisonment.

Who is at risk of recruitment?

• Underage children. They fall for it because of their vulnerability, lack of experience, desire for quick money or emotional “adventure”. 
• Young people looking for work. Students, school graduates who post “looking for a part-time job” announcements on social media and Telegram channels.
• People with drug or alcohol addiction or financial difficulties. Criminals speculate on the desire for quick money or a new dose.

However, in fact, they can target anyone. The FSB also sent messages even to groups of military personnel, trying to recruit them. There were also attempts to establish contact with ordinary passers-by in public transport in Lviv using posters with QR codes.

How exactly does the Russian FSB recruit teenagers? 

Russian special services use various recruitment schemes. Here are three of the most common scenarios: 

• Blackmail with personal data 

They crack into a teenager’s phone or account, find “sensitive” information (photos, videos, correspondence) and use it as leverage: “Either you do our task or everyone will know about it”. The child is frightened and, in order not to lose his or her reputation, performs tasks: photographing objects, setting fire to cars, sabotaging railways or administrative buildings

• They pay for “small” tasks and promise more, but instead of the “final reward” they blow them up.

The victim is found online: through Telegram, TikTok, Discord, job search groups, posters with QR codes in cities. And they involve them step by step. At first, they give a “simple and safe” task: take a photo, make a graffiti, take the “package” to another place. And they pay a small amount as a guarantee that the money will continue.  But instead, they blow up the children on the “final” task in order to avoid paying the money and cover their tracks.

• They blackmail the child with something they have already done 

The victim is found online, first instructions are given, and then blackmail and pressure begin: “You have already become an accomplice in a crime, now do more serious things, otherwise we will tell the police”. This is how a frightened teenager is persuaded to commit arson, terrorist attacks, and sabotage. What are the signs that a child may be recruited or may be at risk? 

They are often expressed in changes in behaviour and environment: 

• A strange new daily schedule: the child regularly disappears without explanation, returns late.
• Sudden mood changes that were not present before.

• Secret correspondence: changing passwords, frequent deletion of correspondence history, hostility when you ask “What are you looking at on your phone?”.
• New social circle: “friends” from the Internet that the child has never mentioned before.
• New property and money: the child gets expensive things, gadgets, or money that he or she can’t explain the origin of. You may also hear a teenager talking about “easy money” on the Internet because they believe in it.

Why do children agree?

• They want money: 2-10 thousand UAH seems like a lot of money for a teenager.
• Need for attention and recognition: if a child lacks support at home, they look for it online.
• An element of play or extreme: adolescents perceive it as an “adventure” without realising the consequences.
• Manipulation and blackmail: first, they are tricked into doing “easy tasks”, then threatened.

What are the consequences for the child? 

• Criminal liability: a child can be convicted of a terrorist attack or sabotage from the age of 14. Sentences are very serious – from 10 years in prison to life imprisonment.
• Danger to life and health: russian curators often blow up children remotely to cover their tracks and avoid paying money.
• Psychological trauma: even if a child doesn’t die or lose his or her health, he or she becomes a hostage to constant fear and blackmail.

How can parents prevent this? 

• Open communication: no criticism or shouting. Talk about real cases, explain the risks.
• Discuss “online safety” together: explain that “easy work” with quick earnings on social media is a huge risk and almost always a fraud. And teach your child that if they receive strange offers, they should contact you immediately.
• Teach your child media literacy. Explain how to check information and why you shouldn’t trust anonymous contacts. Teach them that it’s better to lose a quick and often imaginary UAH 2-10 thousand than to lose their whole life (or risk it).
• Regular attention: notice sudden changes in behaviour, large sums of money or new acquaintances.
• Talk about responsibility: talk about responsibility for crimes. Their young age will not keep them out of prison.
• Legal ways of earning money and financial literacy: if you can, give your child a fixed amount of pocket money every month. Or help your teenager find a safe part-time job, show them an alternative.

What to do if there is already contact with recruiters

• Save evidence: screenshots, correspondence, contacts.
• Contact law enforcement immediately:
• police – 102
• SSU chatbot ‘’Spaly FSB‘’ in Telegram – t.me/spaly_fsb_bot
• Explain to your child that cooperation with law enforcement can save them from punishment and even death. If he or she is afraid to tell you, let him or her contact them on their own.

Advice from the SSU: “If someone offers to “just carry a package”, take a picture of a military unit or set a car on fire, know that they want to use you and then kill you”.

Talking to children works! In Odesa, a 9th-grade student who was planned to be recruited by the FSB did not give in. Unknown persons wrote to him on Telegram and offered to ‘’earn extra money‘’. The task was to set fire to TCR cars and administrative buildings and leave graffiti on them. He was promised money for this. The schoolboy saved the correspondence on his phone and handed it over to an inspector of the Educational Security Service. 

So how can a teenager earn money safely?

Here are some ideas for teenagers to earn extra money

• Help at home, in the family business, or with friends. Encourage children with symbolic tasks for which they can receive money from you 
• Tutoring younger children, looking after animals
• Managing social media for brands
• Handmade work: handmade, crafts, drawing
• Participation in volunteer projects with a scholarship
• Online freelancing (design, texts) 
• Explain that honest earnings are possible. Help them find it and make sure that this offer is safe for the child. 

And remember that teenagers are being recruited in all regions of Ukraine, without exception. Anyone – father or mother – can spot a threat in time if they communicate with their child and are attentive.

During the war, due to the tense security situation in the country, Ukrainians began to exchange more information in group chats of messengers and social media. It’s necessary to be in touch with neighbors in today’s realities. It’s a matter of safety, awareness and supporting each other. However, it’s important to do it correctly – so as not to harm yourself and others. Here are tips on how to make the chat of your house safe and useful at the same time:

• Be considerate of new chat members. Don’t accuse them of collaborating with the enemy on the slightest suspicion. Most often, new members of the house chat are just new residents. Before you start looking for spies among them, analyze the reasons for your suspicions. Often such doubts can be triggered by the stress of bad news.

• Don’t share data about military facilities and critical infrastructure. Sometimes chats with a large number of participants can be used by the enemy to conduct intelligence and destructive propaganda through individual members of the chats. Fair suspicion is caused by chat participants who try to collect information about:
  • warehouses, repair bases and fleets;
  • engineering-equipped positions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and places of residences of personnel;
  • hospitals;
  • important infrastructure facilities – thermal power plants, oil depots, hydraulic structures, etc.;
  • routes of movement of our military personnel, weapons and ammunition.

To prevent sensitive information from falling into the hands of the enemy, don’t publish or distribute such data in messengers groups. If you’re the administrator of the chat, set the appropriate rules and warn the participants about the importance of following them. 

• Don’t share information about the locations of enemy missiles and drones hits in chats. Such information can be used by the enemy to adjust the accuracy of strikes and identify gaps in the air defense system. In the conditions of martial law, the publication of photographs locating the territory and/or real estate is subject to criminal liability. Don’t share in public chats any information about hits, shelling and destruction before it appears in official sources.

However, remain prudent. Strange or unknown sounds heard by one of the neighbors is an acceptable topic for discussion. After all, home chats exist to solve everyday problems, and such questions can be related to emergency situations in the house.

• Demand the chat administrator to delete messages of value to the enemy. Among them are those that may contain:

• • geotags and other metadata of sent files – photo or video;
  • recognizable elements of the area that can be identified on the map – characteristic buildings, landscape, road signs, outdoor advertising, etc.;
  • serial numbers on debris of enemy ammunition;
  • license plates of military equipment, markings on it;
  • real names/surnames of military personnel, their faces.

• Don’t spread information about the liberation of settlements from occupation, unless it’s confirmed by official sources. 

Deoccupation isn’t a one moment and irreversible act, but a complex and sometimes long process, the end of which can only be determined by the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Early spreading of release notices may create unwarranted expectations and put local residents at risk. For example, if they try to return to their apartments due to unverified data. Therefore, distribute information about the liberation of territories or a counterattack only after its official confirmation.

In addition, drawing media attention to a newly liberated settlement can encourage the enemy to make efforts to regain positions.

• Don’t allow yourself to be provoked into emotions, enmity and “betrayal”. 

Disputes in group chats contribute to fueling enmity between Ukrainians. There have been documented cases of emotionally charged calls for wrongdoing being circulated through communities. For example, for the closure of auto and tramways with requirements to turn on the lights. Such propaganda can weaken defense capabilities, so don’t support its spread. Manipulators play on excessive emotions and a sense of injustice. “There is no light in our house, but there is in another” or “there is no electricity in our region, because it’s sent to another region/sold abroad” – vivid examples of such incitement. To avoid emotional influence, always verify information with the help of independent sources – official channels of state institutions, local authorities, in official media. Also take care of establishing and following the rules of the chat: define moderators, unacceptable topics and vocabulary when communicating. Following these rules will allow you to share ideas, thoughts, and information safely and freely in your group chat.

The instruction was developed by the Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security under the Ministry of Culture and Information together with Rakuten Viber. Media experts – the author of the “NotaYenota” project Alyona Romanyuk and the head of the Independent Media Trade Union of Ukraine Serhii Shturkhetskyi joined the development of the recommendations. 

There may be no mobile communication in an emergency. If it is, but it’s weak, you can use lightweight versions of many applications (Facebook Lite, Messenger Lite, Google Go, Google Maps Go). As a result, they take up less space and run faster, even with poor Internet access.

You should also install the maps app on your smartphone, which does not need the network. For example, mapy.cz, or enable the appropriate feature on Google Maps. Note that applications do not automatically download the necessary maps – you must do so in advance.

Consider purchasing an additional spare push-button phone. It can work longer than a smartphone if you use it only for conversations.

In the absence of mobile communication, a walkie-talkie can replace the phone. For example, when you need to move to a safe place, these devices will help a family communicate with each other.

Modern walkie-talkies are easy to use and have a built-in FM receiver. However, we recommend that you prepare a spare battery.

Do not turn on the walkie-talkie on the police or other services frequencies: this will interfere with their work.

First of all, focus on the primary sources of government agencies. Follow the information from the SES, the army, and the government on the pages of their websites or social networks and the messages of the Public Broadcasting.

The Center of Strategic Communications published a list of Telegram channels that position themselves as independent information channels whose work is actually coordinated by the Kremlin. Among them are “Resident,” “Legitimny,” “Cartel,” “Spletnitsa,” and others. Full list:

Below you will find a list of verified sources. Please note that verified (officially confirmed) accounts on social networks have a special mark next to the name – a blue tick. In this way, the social network ensures that this person or institution maintains this page. Not all official institutions in Ukraine have received it yet, so consider the accounts from the list.

Public Broadcasting:

• TV Channel UA: Pershiy (Public Broadcasting)
• Radio Promin
• Ukrainian Radio

Websites of public services:

• State Service of Ukraine for Emergencies
  • facebook
  • twitter
  • instagram
  • telegram
• Armed Forces of Ukraine
  • facebook
  • twitter
  • instagram
• Ministry of Defence Ukraine
  • facebook
  • twitter
  • instagram
• Ministry of Internal Affairs
  • facebook
  • twitter
  • instagram

• Why do I see this information?
• What source disseminated this information (social media page, media or suspicious site)?
• Who is the author of the message (official, journalist or anonymous reporter)?

• Availability of links to sources of information.
• Presentation of facts, assessments and comments, generalizations.
• Photos or videos used to verify information.
• Commentators, experts involved.

• Open Google Chrome. Right-click on the photo you want to check and select “search for images on Google”.
• If you have a different browser, open Google there. Go to the “image search” section. Copy the link to the image and paste it into the search bar.

• Publication dates: same or different?
• Place of publication: who published this photo? Can this source be trusted?
• Does the title and content of the article correspond to the photo?
• Are there any differences between the original photo you found and the photo you wanted to check? For example, a photo is cropped, elements are added or changed.
• In which country was the photo taken? Which country is mentioned in the link?

• Disable automatic network selection (on Android: Settings – Mobile network (or Connection) – Operator, on iOS: Settings – Cellular data – Network selection)
• Find and select an available network: Vodafone UA, UA-KYIVSTAR or LIFECELL
• If registration fails, try again or choose another
• Check the possibility of an outgoing call, SMS